UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS 2001 S/2001/532

READEX Security Council 56th Year to S/2001/535

Plenary Meetings

United Nations S/2001/532

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2001
English
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Letter dated 26 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

International intercourse is grounded in well-established principles, and foremost among them is the principle of respect for the sovereignty of States that forbids interference in their internal affairs and the undermining of their security and stability. The Charter of the United Nations affirms this principle, inasmuch as Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter states that:

> "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter; ..."

The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 and annexed to its resolution 2625 (XXV), proclaims:

> "The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

It also proclaims:

> "The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter."

This principle forbids any State or group of States to intervene, directly or indirectly and for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.

The United States of America and its dependency, the United Kingdom, despite the fact that they are permanent members of the Security Council and thus have additional responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, nevertheless violate the purposes and principles of the Charter whenever their own narrow political interests and their hegemonistic objectives so require.

The conduct of these two countries towards Iraq is the most telling indication of their contempt for the Charter of the United Nations, the Organization's resolutions, the fundamentals of international intercourse and also, indeed, the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, in which the Council itself affirms the commitment of all States Members of the United Nations to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq. These two countries are using armed force on a daily basis against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq in the two no-flight zones that they imposed by their unilateral decision, and these two countries are supporting, funding and training terrorist groups for the purpose of undermining Iraq's security and threatening its territorial integrity.

The most recent action by the United States stemming from its policy of seeking to undermine Iraq's stability and endanger its sovereignty and territorial integrity has been to host a group of representatives of rebel bands in northern Iraq so that they might participate, together with representatives of numerous countries, in two training courses in the United States, one to study the development of institutional systems and the other on the management of financial resources, as part of a three-week programme held from 7 to 25 May 2001.

The fact that the United States Department of State included elements from rebel groups in northern Iraq in a training course attended by representatives of many countries, including Arab countries and others, constitutes wanton interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, a violation of Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence and a stimulus to rebellion in the country that must be eliminated.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/533

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2001
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Original: Arabic

Letter dated 26 May 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I should like to refer to the letter from the representative of Kuwait to the United Nations that was circulated as document S/2001/412. That letter speaks of the intentions Iraq has for Kuwait, "which are other than peaceful and are, indeed, hostile". In view of the fact that the Kuwaiti regime is continuing to voice these allegations in order to conceal the true nature of the hostile intentions with respect to Iraq that it communicates in both word and deed, I should like to state the facts set forth hereunder.

1. The Kuwaiti regime continues to employ the resources, territory and airspace of Kuwait in order to commit aggression against Iraq and perpetuate the iniquitous embargo being maintained against it. Since 1992, on a daily basis, United States and British aircraft have been taking off from bases in Kuwait to kill Iraqi citizens and destroy Iraqi civilian installations. Your reports to the Security Council on the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, the most recent of which was that circulated as document S/2001/287, clearly show that there are constant violations of the demilitarized zone by aircraft based in Kuwaiti territory. In the relevant letters addressed to you on a regular basis by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq has always stressed that the logistic support provided to the Americans and British by Kuwait makes that country a partner in the aggression committed against Iraq and that it thus incurs international responsibility under international law, including liability for full compensation for the losses and damage, in both human and material terms, that are caused by this aggression.

My Government addresses an appeal in this connection to the countries participating in the aggression to desist forthwith from unlawful actions that violate Iraq's sovereignty and jeopardize its security and integrity, and it is determined to confront them in a most resolute manner. This is a matter that pertains to the core of the Government of Iraq's responsibility to defend the Iraqi people, and it is a question of a right that is guaranteed by all the relevant international covenants and by the rules and norms of international law.

2. Since 1991, the Kuwaiti regime has been pursuing a fixed policy of interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq and supporting and funding terrorist groups of proxies and mercenaries that seek to undermine Iraq's stability and to jeopardize its security and the safety of its people. Many of these terrorist organizations have their headquarters in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti regime uses its information media to promote them, and officials of the regime meet with them at the highest levels. The Kuwaiti

regime has also not been hesitant in calling for a change of the political regime in Iraq. With his letter dated 18 June 1998 addressed to you (S/1998/580, annex), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq enclosed a list of examples of statements made by senior Kuwaiti officials and of meetings held with leading figures of the so-called Iraqi opposition. The rulers of Kuwait have persisted with this habit of interfering openly in the internal affairs of Iraq and threatening its sovereignty and stability and the security of the region. Here are some recent examples of such statements:

Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of Oil, stated to Agence France-Presse on 12 March 1999 that "We want to see a clear end to the currently existing regime in Iraq", adding "We would like to work with the Iraqis to find an alternative to the currently existing regime";

On 27 September 2000 the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Siyasah* called for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, saying "Any action for its overthrow has become a necessary option for the region and the international community";

On 24 April 2001 the Kuwaiti Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stated to the Kuwaiti newspaper *Al-Ra'y al-Amm* that "The Iraqi regime is outside the law".

These practices and statements are manifestly incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq, in all of which the Council affirms respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq. They represent a dangerous trend in international relations, and the Kuwaiti regime is to be held fully responsible for the outcome of such acts of aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2001/534

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 May 2001

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus

(for the period from 28 November 2000 to 29 May 2001)

I. Introduction

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 28 November 2000 to 29 May 2001 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 1331 (2000) of 13 December 2000.

II. Activities of the Force

A. Maintenance of the ceasefire and the military status quo

2. The military situation along the ceasefire lines remained calm. There were, however, small incidents caused by both the National Guard and the Turkish forces, mainly in Nicosia. These included stone throwing, verbal abuse and temporary moves forward into the unmanned locations. In one potentially more serious incident, a soldier from the Turkish forces fired two shots into the air near a United Nations officer protesting a construction by the Turkish forces.

3. Air violations of the United Nations buffer zone decreased from 47 during the last reporting period to 33. Four were by National Guard aircraft, 8 by Turkish forces aircraft, 15 by light civilian aircraft from the south, 1 by a civilian aircraft from the north, 2 by Cyprus police helicopters and 3 by aircraft of unknown origin.

4. Since December 2000, the National Guard has developed two major defensive works on its ceasefire line just outside the United Nations buffer zone near Pyla. UNFICYP protested this construction as incompatible with the military status quo, but work continued. In response, the Turkish forces constructed two berms and dug 120 metres of a new trench between existing positions at a Turkish forces post which is a permanent violation inside the United Nations buffer zone above Pyla. In spite of repeated demands by UNFICYP, the Turkish forces have refused to return this post to the status quo ante and recently added a new barbed wire fence to the north of this position. Reinforced concrete firing positions are also being installed along much of the National Guard ceasefire line.

5. Crossings of the maritime security lines — the seaward extensions of the median line of the buffer zone, which vessels of either side are advised, for their own safety, not to cross — have continued. In the east, near Famagusta, there were hundreds of crossings by vessels from the south, mainly pleasure craft and fishing boats. Two police helicopters and, on one occasion, armed National Guard inflatables and coastguard vessels also crossed the lines. In the west, at the Kokkina pocket, the crossings were mainly by Turkish forces vessels using a shorter route on their supply runs to and from Kokkina.

6. Restrictions imposed on UNFICYP by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Turkish forces since 1 July 2000 have remained in force, including the violation of the military status quo by the Turkish forces/Turkish Cypriot security forces in the village of

Strovilia. Further, the restriction of movement along the Famagusta-Dherinia road, imposed on 1 November 2000, continued to prevent UNFICYP from monitoring the whole of the fenced area of Varosha. Observation by UNFICYP is now limited to the areas visible from static observation posts and a short patrol route well away from the fence. Within Varosha, the Turkish forces have continued renovations on some buildings. Additionally, the Turkish forces continued to fly flags on one of these buildings, in violation of the military status quo. The United Nations holds the Government of Turkey responsible for the maintenance of the status quo in Varosha. There were numerous incursions into the buffer zone by civilians, mainly Greek Cypriot farmers, villagers and workers who had failed to obtain the necessary permit from UNFICYP, and a large number by Greek Cypriot hunters.

B. Restoration of normal conditions and humanitarian functions

7. Activities and contacts involving Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued. Activities organized with UNFICYP's assistance at Ledra Palace included four meetings of political party representatives; an information technology conference; gatherings of businessmen and non-governmental organizations; and a large public event involving approximately 3,000 young people, organized by the youth branches of political parties. Other activities, outside the buffer zone, included a visit by members of a Turkish Cypriot political party to Limassol, and by members of a Greek Cypriot political party to Morphou; a students' gathering at the University of Cyprus; and participation by students from the north and the south at a British Council-organized seminar which took place one day in the south and the following day in the north. In some cases, the Turkish Cypriot authorities denied permission to Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to cross the Turkish forces ceasefire line to take part in such events. Since March, they have required that all applicants (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and foreigners) should personally fill in forms at Ledra crossing point and pay a fee of one pound (£1). Previously, the practice had been for the Turkish Cypriot host to apply for his/her Greek Cypriot guest. The new requirement led to the cancellation of some of the events.

8. UNFICYP continued to perform its mandated humanitarian tasks in support of the 428 Greek Cypriots and 167 Maronites living in the northern part of the island and those Turkish Cypriots in the southern part who have made themselves known to the Force. The Turkish Cypriot authorities now require Greek Cypriots to apply in person five days in advance for permission to visit family members living in the north. They no longer accept applications submitted by UNFICYP, except in the case of schoolchildren whose parents live in the north.

9. On 1 December 2000, Mr. Ömer Gazi Tekoğul, a Turkish Cypriot from the mixed village of Pyla, was arrested by the Cyprus police and charged with possession of heroin. The Turkish Cypriot authorities averred that the arrest had occurred in the United Nations buffer zone, where neither side can exercise authority, while the Cyprus police maintained that it occurred outside the buffer zone. UNFICYP's own investigation did not yield sufficient evidence to confirm or refute either version. Mr. Tekoğul was tried in the district court in Larnaca and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. UNFICYP continues to provide humanitarian support to Mr Tekoğul by facilitating visits by family, friends and doctors.

10. On 13 December 2000, Mr. Panicos Tsiakourmas, a Greek Cypriot, was arrested on suspicion of possessing cannabis and subsequently detained in the north. Although the Turkish Cypriot authorities maintained that he had been arrested in the north, the British police produced evidence that he was taken illegally and by force from the Eastern Sovereign Base area of Dhekelia and was not in possession of any narcotic substances at the time. On 26 April 2001, a Turkish Cypriot court found Mr. Tsiakourmas guilty and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment. He was released immediately on the grounds of good behaviour and time served.

11. In the mixed village of Pyla, in the buffer zone, there was some tension at the end of April, as a result of the raising of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags in several locations. This was in violation of an agreement reached among the two communities in the village and UNFICYP, which severely restricts the display of national symbols.

12. UNFICYP assisted civilian activities in the buffer zone, for instance, by facilitating work to improve the water supply to the north, and escorting farmers

working on their land in the buffer zone. UNFICYP also facilitated a visit by approximately 250 Greek Cypriots to a church in the buffer zone near Varisha, north-west of Lefka, to mark St. George's day (22 April 2001).

13. The United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP) through the United Nations Office for Project Services, continued to implement its programme aimed at promoting goodwill by encouraging Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to work together in the preparation and implementation of projects in areas of mutual concern, notably public health, environment, sanitation, water, urban renovation, preservation of cultural heritage, natural resources and education.

C. Missing persons

14. In accordance with my letter addressed to the two leaders in May 2000, the First Assistant to the Third Member of the Committee on Missing Persons has worked with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members to overcome existing obstacles and enable the Committee to reach binding decisions and resume its activities. This effort continued. The Government of Cyprus also continued, in areas under its control, its unilateral programme of exhumation and identification of the remains of persons, some of whom had been previously listed as missing.

III. Mission of good offices

15. As I reported to the Council last December (see S/2000/1138), I had invited Mr. Glafcos Clerides and Mr. Rauf Denktash to attend proximity talks in Geneva in late January. My Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, travelled to the island in January 2001 for meetings with Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, as well as to Greece and Turkey. Mr. Denktash asked that no date for proximity talks be set. It has not proved possible to resume talks during the reporting period. However, Mr. de Soto has continued to hold consultations on my behalf with a number of Governments and organizations, and he is proceeding with preparations and consultations so as to be of assistance to the parties at the appropriate time.

IV. Organizational matters

16. As of May 2001, UNFICYP comprised 1,216 troops, 35 civilian police and 183 civilian staff, of whom 40 had been recruited internationally and 143 locally. The military personnel were from Argentina (410), Austria (245), Canada (2), Finland (6), Hungary (114), Ireland (5), the Netherlands (100), Slovenia (29), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (305). The Argentinean contingent included nine soldiers from the following countries: Bolivia (two), Brazil (two), Chile (one), Paraguay (one) and Uruguay (three). The civilian police were from Australia (15) and Ireland (20).

17. Austria and Slovenia will commence the withdrawal of their troops from the Mission on 5 June. The withdrawal will be completed in September. They will be replaced by Slovakian troops, whose advance team arrived on 27 May. The Netherlands company which was incorporated in the British contingent under a bilateral agreement will be withdrawn by 7 June and replaced by British troops.

18. Mr. de Soto continued as my Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz as Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission, and Major General Victory Rana as Force Commander.

V. Financial aspects

19. The proposed budget for the maintenance of UNFICYP for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 is currently under consideration by the General Assembly. The cost of maintaining the Force is estimated at $42,389,219 gross ($40,697,145 net), including pledged voluntary contributions of one third of the cost of the Force from the Government of Cyprus ($13,565,715) and of $6.5 million from the Government of Greece. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 15 June 2001 for a further six-month period, an amount of $22,323,504 gross ($20,631,430 net) will be assessed on Member States.

20. As of 30 April 2001, outstanding contributions to the Special Account for UNFICYP amounted to $20.3 million, representing some 10.7 per cent of total assessed contributions from 16 June 1993 to the period ending 15 June 2001.

VI. Observations

21. During the past six months, the situation along the ceasefire lines has remained stable. However, the conditions under which UNFICYP operated remained difficult, owing to the restrictions imposed on it by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and Turkish forces. These restrictions remained in force despite efforts to have them lifted and to have the military status quo ante at Strovilia restored.

22. In the current circumstances, I consider the presence of UNFICYP essential for the maintenance of the ceasefire on the island. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months, until 15 December 2001.

23. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Mr. Alvaro de Soto, my Special Adviser, to Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz, the Acting Special Representative and Chief of Mission, to Major General Victory Rana, the Force Commander, and to the men and women serving with UNFICYP for the professionalism and dedication with which they have carried out their duties.



MEDITERRANEAN SEA
HQ UNFICYP
HQ SECTOR 2
(BRITCON & NL ELM)
HQ SECTOR 1
(ARGCON)
HQ Company
One Company
One Company
One Platoon
KYRENIA
SECTOR 1
UNPA
NICOSIA
SECTOR 2
FAMAGUSTA
SECTOR 4
HQ SECTOR 4
(AUSCON / HUNCON / SICON)
HQ Company
One Company
(AUSCON / SICON)
LARNACA
(HUNCON)
PAPHOS
LIMASSOL
32°50'
33°00'
33°30'
34°00'
34°30'
35°30'
35°00'
34°30'
Airport, airstrip
Aéroport, piste d'atterrissage
Аэродром, взлетно-посадочная полоса
Aeropuerto, pista de aterrizaje
District boundary
Limite de district
Граница округа
Límite de distrito
Cease-fire lines of Turkish forces
Lignes du cessez-le-feu des forces turques
Линии прекращения огня турецких войск
Líneas de cesación del fuego de las fuerzas turcas
Cease-fire lines of Cypriot National Guard
Lignes du cessez-le-feu de la Garde nationale chypriote
Линии прекращения огня Национальной гвардии Кипра
Líneas de cesación del fuego de la Guardia Nacional chipriota
UNFICYP operational boundaries
Limites des zones d'opérations d'UNFICYP
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНК
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la UNFICYP

2001 年 6 月的联塞部队部署

UNFICYP DEPLOYMENT AS OF JUNE 2001
DÉPLOIEMENT DE L'UNFICYP AU MOIS DE JUIN 2001
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНК НА ИЮНЬ 2001
DESPLIEGUE DE LA UNFICYP EN JUNIO DE 2001

Map No. 2930 Rev. 44 UNITED NATIONS
June 2001

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Letter dated 30 May 2001 from the representatives of Argentina, Canada, Ghana, India, Jordan, the Netherlands and New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to the letter of 23 January 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/73) which contained a proposal for improving cooperation between the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, we the undersigned are pleased to provide additional thoughts on how to achieve such cooperation. We ask that the Security Council Working Group considering this issue give it their favourable consideration.

We would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Luis E. **Cappagli**
Deputy Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

(*Signed*) Paul **Heinbecker**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Nana **Effah-Apenteng**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Kamalesh **Sharma**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Zeid Ra'ad Zeid **Al'Hussein**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Dirk Jan **van den Berg**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Don **MacKay**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations

Annex to the letter dated 30 May 2001 from the representatives of Argentina, Canada, Ghana, India, Jordan, the Netherlands and New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Thoughts on implementing the concept of a mission-specific cooperative management committee

Introduction

The concept of a mission-specific cooperative management committee is based on the need for all three parties in the "triangular relationship" (the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat) to cooperate integrally in the management of peace operations:

(a) Preparations;

(b) Establishing a mission-specific cooperative management committee;

(c) Managing a mission;

(d) Termination.

Such cooperation goes beyond consultation to participation in decision-making.

Phase I
Preparations

Prior to a Security Council decision to launch a peace support mission, the Secretariat begins the "mission planning" process, occasioned either by the Security Council seizing itself of an issue or at the direction from the Secretary-General or both.

Using the United Nations standby arrangements system, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations identifies possible major troop contributors to a potential mission.

Those Member States are approached informally by the Secretariat to determine their interest in participating.

Those potentially interested in making substantial contributions are invited to participate in a survey mission.

Committed Member States participate in the mission planning process and are included in preliminary work on discussing the mandate, the concept of operations, the rules of engagement etc.

Phase II
Establishing a mission-specific cooperative management committee

The Security Council establishes a peace support operation and a mission-specific cooperative management committee that includes the major troop contributors.

The committee elects its chair from among its members.

The committee undertakes to practice transparency towards other troop contributors not represented in the committee and to keep them informed on a regular basis.

Member States are free to determine the level of their representation on the committee; participation of military (and civilian police) advisers from delegations and the Secretariat would be useful.

Consensus among members of the committee is sought in the development of the mandate and/or concept of operations.

Troop-contributing countries that cannot accept an emerging consensus on a mandate and/or concept of operations withdraw from the mission.

Phase III
Managing a mission

The mission-specific cooperative management committee reviews the political/military guidance for the force commander, the continuing validity of the mandate, its extension and/or its modification, and its termination.

The committee is kept informed by the Secretariat either concurrently with the Security Council or in meetings with the Security Council about the operation in all its aspects.

The committee meets with the Council when any change in the mandate is contemplated, in particular, the broadening or narrowing of scope of the mission, the introduction of new or additional functions or components, or a change in the authorization to use force; the renewal of a mandate; significant or serious political, military or humanitarian developments; a rapid deterioration of the security situation on the ground; the termination, withdrawal or scaling down in size of the operation, including the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building.

Phase IV
Termination

The mission-specific cooperative management committee recommends to the Council the termination of the mission when there is a consensus that the operation has achieved its major goals or that no decisive purpose is served by prolonging it.

The final decision on the continuation or termination of an operation remains with the Council; troop-contributing countries, equally, retain the right to withdraw from a mission.

Considerations

The Security Council would at all times retain the right to make decisions.

The establishment of an operation-specific cooperative committee should, in most circumstances, supplant any existing "groups of friends".

The management structure described above is fully consistent with Article 44 of the Charter of the United Nations which speaks of participation in the decisions of the Council concerning the employment of troops; it also respects all Articles under Chapter V of the Charter pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of the Security Council.